It is necessary to reevaluate the state of Russia’s arsenal of cruise~ , ballistic, and air-launched missiles with a range of more than 300 kilometers in light of the significant Russian missile attacks against Ukraine in recent days, as well as evidence of the growing effectiveness of Ukraine’s air and missile defense. The estimates below do not claim to be exhaustive or without challenge, but rather they aim to spark a professional conversation about the proper evaluation and comprehension of Russia’s actual military capabilities. The proposed figures are based on both expert estimates of Russia’s missile stocks made in earlier years and official Ukrainian statistics on those Russian missiles fired during the conflict, which were both disclosed in recent months.
The subsequent estimate These figures typically do not account for missiles that exploded right away or shortly after launch, though. The total quantity of these missiles is probably negligible. A report on Russia’s missile storage and production rates was released by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on January 3 .
Based on this information, it is estimated that, following the most recent attack on May 18, Russia has a number of cruise, tactical ballistic, and air-launched missiles with a range of more than 300 kilometers. The quantity of cruise missiles left in Russian storage is higher for this alternate assessment even though the actual manufacturing rates in Russia are far lower than they are in Ukraine.
The issue here is that, compared to prior years, the average yearly production rates are thought to be stable for 2022–2023; nevertheless, it was unclear whether Russian missile manufacturers were already able to significantly boost their manufacturing rates. Therefore, it is still possible that this estimation of production rates needs to be raised in the coming weeks, particularly in regards to the Kalibr, Kh-101, and Iskander-K missiles.
However, it is certain that Russia will require a number of years to rebuild the missile arsenal it possessed before the conflict. Additionally, even if Russian missile producers were able to significantly increase production rates, Moscow would find it difficult, if not impossible, to sustain these elevated rates over the long term given Western sanctions on crucial industrial equipment and components required to produce these munitions, as well as a severe lack of skilled workers in the country’s defense industry. Actually, the technical industrial machinery required for the production of missile engines has likely been the more significant barrier in this situation rather than microchips or other electronics. Consequently, it is unknown how these usage and production rates would have impact Russian.
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